Post by Admin on May 26, 2021 8:19:43 GMT -7
Prior to World War 2 (1939-1945), United States military aviation doctrine centered primarily on gaining complete air superiority over the enemy with a sound stock of "pursuit" fighters meeting the enemy head on.
A secondary focus was provided to Lightweight bomb delivery platforms.
All that changed when the Germans - through their Blitzkrieg of Western Europe - showcased the dive bomber in terrifying fashion with their Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka". The aircraft rained ordnance down on key targets and troop formations ahead of the main invading force - softening areas prior to involvement of ground elements.
The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) was forced to quickly shift its focus to acquire its own dive bombing strike platforms.
Army officials preferred to stay away from more complex twin-engined designs and favored development of a single-engine, monoplane wing form utilizing a crew of two or three. Defensive armament was a must to help defend what would most likely be a slow-moving airplane. Several initiatives were pushed including the Douglas A-17, the Curtiss A-18, and the Vultee A-19 though none were winners in the Army search until the service took on a small stock of U.S. Navy Douglas SBD "DauntIess" dive bombers in July of 1940.
warfarehistorynetwork.com/2015/12/20/the-douglas-sbd-dauntless-dive-bomber/
A swinging bomb cradle carried a 1,000 lb bomb below the fuselage and a 100 lb bomb was mounted under each wing. The bomb cradle was designed so that the bomb would swing clear of the prop during dive-bombing maneuvers.
With a few revisions - namely the deletion of the carrier deck arrestor equipment and replacement of Navy radio kits - the SBD was reconstituted for the Army in the new A-24 "Banshee" form. While not the complete solution for the Army, the Banshee had to suffice until a proper aircraft was adopted.
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420055.pdf
www.historynet.com/how-allied-air-attacks-evolved-during-world-war-ii.htm
General Giulio Douhet (30 May 1869 – 15 February 1930) was an Italian general and air power theorist. He was a key proponent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare. He was a contemporary of the 1920s air warfare advocates Walther Wever, Billy Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard.
Assuming that population and industrial centers would be vulnerable to fleets of heavy bombers, Douhet advocated attacking an enemy nation’s urban areas and factories with explosives, incendiaries and poisonous gas—with no distinction being made between combatant and noncombatant. Douhet believed that the impact of strategic bombing would simultaneously demoralize an enemy’s civilian population and destroy its capacity to wage war.
During the 1920s, Douhet’s theories and those of air power advocate Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell gained champions within the U.S. Army Air Corps, and strategic bombing doctrine began to be reflected in its field manuals. Chief among this new generation of bomber advocates in the late 1930s was the leader of the Army Air Corps, General Henry “Hap” Arnold. As the commander in chief of the American air service, General Arnold surrounded himself with “bomber men,” disciples of daylight strategic precision bombing. According to Arnold and his top commanders, the primary purpose of air power in Europe during the coming conflicts would be strategic bombing. Strategic bombing was the only major contribution the airmen could make to the war effort that was largely independent of the Army and Navy. If air power was to show its capabilities as an equal partner to ground and naval forces, it would be done through the successes of strategic bombing.
Because of the prohibitive cost of creating a bomber fleet on a “Douhetian” scale in the interwar fiscal environment, the U.S. Army Air Corps Tactical School advocated only the precision bombing of an enemy nation’s vital centers–its factories, power sources, transportation and raw materials. Advocates believed this goal could be achieved through the use of the new, fast, long-range “precision bombers” coming into service late in the 1930s, the B-17 Flying Fortress and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator.
Powered by four turbocharged engines, the B-17s and B-24s were, at the time of their test flights in the mid-1930s, faster than most of the world’s operational interceptors. ‘If the superior speed of the bomber was such to make interception improbable, or at worst, infrequent, then no provision need be made for escort fighters to accompany the bombers on their long range missions,’ said one modern analyst of the 1930s air doctrine. Moreover, the new heavy bombers flew above 20,000 feet, too high to be reached by most ground-based antiaircraft.
The Air Corps bomber men believed the American heavy bombers would fly high and fast into enemy territory, eluding interceptors and antiaircraft defenses. Once above the target area, these “self-defending” American bombers would utilize the world’s most sophisticated bombsight—the Norden—which allowed for such factors as speed, course, wind direction and distance to target. Under favorable conditions, trained aircrews were able to place their payloads within a few hundred feet of their target from over 15,000 feet, prompting an Army Air Forces spokesman to boast that the aircrews could “drop a bomb into a pickle barrel at 25,000 feet.” But for the Norden bombsight to work well, American pilots had to deliver their payloads during daylight hours, in good weather and in level flight.
A secondary focus was provided to Lightweight bomb delivery platforms.
All that changed when the Germans - through their Blitzkrieg of Western Europe - showcased the dive bomber in terrifying fashion with their Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka". The aircraft rained ordnance down on key targets and troop formations ahead of the main invading force - softening areas prior to involvement of ground elements.
The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) was forced to quickly shift its focus to acquire its own dive bombing strike platforms.
Army officials preferred to stay away from more complex twin-engined designs and favored development of a single-engine, monoplane wing form utilizing a crew of two or three. Defensive armament was a must to help defend what would most likely be a slow-moving airplane. Several initiatives were pushed including the Douglas A-17, the Curtiss A-18, and the Vultee A-19 though none were winners in the Army search until the service took on a small stock of U.S. Navy Douglas SBD "DauntIess" dive bombers in July of 1940.
warfarehistorynetwork.com/2015/12/20/the-douglas-sbd-dauntless-dive-bomber/
A swinging bomb cradle carried a 1,000 lb bomb below the fuselage and a 100 lb bomb was mounted under each wing. The bomb cradle was designed so that the bomb would swing clear of the prop during dive-bombing maneuvers.
With a few revisions - namely the deletion of the carrier deck arrestor equipment and replacement of Navy radio kits - the SBD was reconstituted for the Army in the new A-24 "Banshee" form. While not the complete solution for the Army, the Banshee had to suffice until a proper aircraft was adopted.
An even greater change had to be made as Germany began building larger bombers.
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420055.pdf
www.historynet.com/how-allied-air-attacks-evolved-during-world-war-ii.htm
General Giulio Douhet (30 May 1869 – 15 February 1930) was an Italian general and air power theorist. He was a key proponent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare. He was a contemporary of the 1920s air warfare advocates Walther Wever, Billy Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard.
Assuming that population and industrial centers would be vulnerable to fleets of heavy bombers, Douhet advocated attacking an enemy nation’s urban areas and factories with explosives, incendiaries and poisonous gas—with no distinction being made between combatant and noncombatant. Douhet believed that the impact of strategic bombing would simultaneously demoralize an enemy’s civilian population and destroy its capacity to wage war.
During the 1920s, Douhet’s theories and those of air power advocate Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell gained champions within the U.S. Army Air Corps, and strategic bombing doctrine began to be reflected in its field manuals. Chief among this new generation of bomber advocates in the late 1930s was the leader of the Army Air Corps, General Henry “Hap” Arnold. As the commander in chief of the American air service, General Arnold surrounded himself with “bomber men,” disciples of daylight strategic precision bombing. According to Arnold and his top commanders, the primary purpose of air power in Europe during the coming conflicts would be strategic bombing. Strategic bombing was the only major contribution the airmen could make to the war effort that was largely independent of the Army and Navy. If air power was to show its capabilities as an equal partner to ground and naval forces, it would be done through the successes of strategic bombing.
Because of the prohibitive cost of creating a bomber fleet on a “Douhetian” scale in the interwar fiscal environment, the U.S. Army Air Corps Tactical School advocated only the precision bombing of an enemy nation’s vital centers–its factories, power sources, transportation and raw materials. Advocates believed this goal could be achieved through the use of the new, fast, long-range “precision bombers” coming into service late in the 1930s, the B-17 Flying Fortress and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator.
Powered by four turbocharged engines, the B-17s and B-24s were, at the time of their test flights in the mid-1930s, faster than most of the world’s operational interceptors. ‘If the superior speed of the bomber was such to make interception improbable, or at worst, infrequent, then no provision need be made for escort fighters to accompany the bombers on their long range missions,’ said one modern analyst of the 1930s air doctrine. Moreover, the new heavy bombers flew above 20,000 feet, too high to be reached by most ground-based antiaircraft.
The Air Corps bomber men believed the American heavy bombers would fly high and fast into enemy territory, eluding interceptors and antiaircraft defenses. Once above the target area, these “self-defending” American bombers would utilize the world’s most sophisticated bombsight—the Norden—which allowed for such factors as speed, course, wind direction and distance to target. Under favorable conditions, trained aircrews were able to place their payloads within a few hundred feet of their target from over 15,000 feet, prompting an Army Air Forces spokesman to boast that the aircrews could “drop a bomb into a pickle barrel at 25,000 feet.” But for the Norden bombsight to work well, American pilots had to deliver their payloads during daylight hours, in good weather and in level flight.
The following airplanes required precise use of the Norden Bomb Sight.
